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Abstract: 
 
In this chapter, Frances Bottenberg argues that influential contemporary theories of emotion have 
yet to solve the classic puzzle of how the peculiar felt aspect of emotion is to be linked with its 
normative salience for particular action. This is in part due to how little mainstream attention has 
so far been paid to the role of the first-person body in emotional life. Building on recent and 
classic phenomenological insights, Bottenberg argues that emotional drive is best understood as 
an intelligent sensitivity played out not simply in but by the first-person body. In this so-called 
animationist reading of emotional valuing, emotional drive expresses the constant intracorporeal 
enactment of and adaptation to the fluctuating agent/world relationship. 
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Emotion as the animation of value 
 
Frances Bottenberg 
 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
1. Beyond percepts, markers and signals 
 
Contemporary integrative theories of emotion aim to provide adequate accounts of the 
relationship between emotional feeling and evaluative meaning. Central among these are 
perceptualist accounts and what might be termed “signalist” accounts. Perceptualism in its 
weaker form demonstrates significant phenomenal and epistemic similarities between 
emotional and perceptual experience, and in its stronger form classifies emotion as a kind of 
perception, for instance as “a perception of value” (Nussbaum 2001, 1-2).
1
 The signalist 
viewpoint meanwhile promotes emotional life as a system of pre-established mechanisms 
waiting to be set off by appropriate eliciting conditions. Emotion thereby becomes 
representational, acting as a signal, sensor, marker, alarm or beacon to alert higher level 
consciousness to conditions imminently affecting the organism.
2
 
Both perceptualism and signalism produce valuable insights. On the one hand, 
perceptualism encourages the exploration of phenomena that operate largely pre-reflectively 
and pre-linguistically, opening up realms once thought automatic and dumb to serious 
philosophical examination. Signalist theories, on the other hand, make sense of emotion’s 
normative content within a coherent biological, physiological and neurological overview of 
the emotional system. In so doing, they revive William James’ insight regarding the intimate 
bond between the somatic and the evaluative in emotion.  
Despite these insights, however, contemporary approaches to emotion fall short of 
providing a satisfying account of the first person body’s role in emotional life. In particular, 
perceptualist accounts do not solve the classic puzzle of emotion theory, namely how the felt 
aspect of emotion is to be linked with its normative salience for action. The puzzle remains as 
                                                            
1
 Among those theorists who endorse weaker versions of perceptualism are included Ronald de Sousa (1987), 
Louis Charland (1997), Sabine Döring (2007), Christine Tappolet (2000), Peter Goldie (2004, 2009), Bennett 
Helm (2001), Martha Nussbaum (2001), Deborah Achtenberg (2002), Robert Roberts (2003), Michael Stocker 
(2008) and Julien Deonna (2006). Döring and Tappolet, for instance, consider emotions to be instructively 
similar because both emotions and perceptions are non-inferentially and perspectivally structured and are, in 
their view, non-rational. For other theorists, including Deonna and de Sousa, emotions present “evaluative 
facts,” which, like simply descriptive facts, track information about the agent-world relationship. While 
descriptive facts represent the world visually, tactilely, aurally, gustatorily, and olfactorily, evaluative facts 
reveal what we care about. Finally, some perceptualists, such as Goldie, Helm and Stocker, emphasize 
phenomenological affinities between emotion and perception, more precisely, the inseparability of their 
intentional, perspectival, and qualitative content. Jesse Prinz (2004, 2007) adopts a stronger form of 
perceptualism, reducing emotion to a kind of perception. For Prinz, emotions are perceptions of bodily changes, 
which in turn signal so-called core relational themes, which concern agent and world relationships (such as, for 
example, the threat of harm). Cf. Mikko Salmela (2011) provides an excellent survey and critique of 
perceptualism in contemporary emotion theory. 
2
 The signalist assumption forms the basis of the emotion theories of Antonio Damasio and Jesse Prinz. 
Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis (1996; 1994/2006), founded in neurology and anti-Cartesian sentiment, 
remains the most widely known contemporary attempt to shed light on the essential interaction (or even unity) 
of physical and mental in the case of emotional experience. Philosopher Jesse Prinz’ theory of embodied 
appraisal (which is a strongly perceptualist theory) builds on Damasio’s ideas, adding an account of the 
intentionality of emotion. The smoke detector, or the tones emitted by the smoke detector, is Prinz’s preferred 
analogy to capture the manner in which emotions signal matters of concern to reflective agency.  
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daunting as ever, even granting that many similarities exist between perceptual and emotional 
experience. Further, while we remark upon the dynamic nature of emotional processing, 
theories still tend to fall back on a mechanistic and third-person picture of somatic life and 
emotional drive. The task thus remains to understand the nature of emotional drive in relation 
to endogenous movement and sense-making both at the reflective and pre-reflective levels.  
In what follows, I will argue that emotional drive is best understood as an intelligent 
sensitivity that plays out within the first person body.
3
 In effect, my aim in this essay is to 
take up Maxine Sheets-Johnstone’s challenge to place to the side the notion of the “embodied 
mind” and of “embodiment” as a general classification of human experience. Instead, the 
following inquiry takes seriously the concept of “mindful body” and a first person bodily 
“kinetic logos” (Sheets-Johnstone 1999, 487, 506). To do this, I will argue that the first 
person body is the primary locus of emotional agency and develop what could be called an 
animationist account of emotional valuing. This account considers emotional drive to be the 
result of an ongoing pre-reflective transcription of existential-evaluative meanings into the 
motor-kinetic dynamism of emotional experience. I believe that such an approach can rescue 
the pre-reflective and non-linguistic sphere of emotional events from the unyielding concepts 
of automaticity, simple reflex, and mechanism, and in this way offer some progress towards 
solving the classic puzzle of emotion theory.  
 
 
 
2. Emotional impulse and existential valuing  
 
I propose beginning with a concrete emotional experience. When we are really angry, 
so angry “our blood boils,” do we feel more inclined to shout and gesticulate, or to lie down 
and close our eyes? Naturally, the former. Releasing outward-directed, explosive, loud force 
feels in the moment more fluidly and immediately available than slow, inward-retreating 
action. Of course, in deference to our moral principles, sense of decorum or simple caution, 
we may restrain ourselves to a greater or lesser degree from releasing that force. However, 
such restraint does not feel good or right in the heat of the moment.  
One way to make sense of this situation is to consider every array of motor-program 
options (not just those involved in emotion) as constrained by normative parameters – to put 
it simply, the ‘I can’ being always subordinated to the ‘I should’ or ‘I shouldn’t’ (where, it 
must be stressed, the ‘I’ needn’t refer to self-conscious ego, but simply an active agency, or a 
concerted and directed sense of effort and concern). While my body can do many things, for 
effective action its capacities must be curtailed to suit the ends of a given context. 
Rosenbaum et al (1993) speak of “soft constraints,” Ratcliffe of “pragmatic concern” and 
practical possibility:  
 
The world is not configured solely in terms of what I can do with it. A sense of 
how I might act is tied up with a sense of what might happen, what might be 
avoided and what cannot be avoided. In addition, my possibilities are 
entangled with the possibilities that the world offers for others. I also 
sometimes experience an absence of the relevant practical possibilities, as a 
sense of loss that pervades everything. (Ratcliffe 2008, 127) 
 
                                                            
3
 The first person body is the Leib or “lived body” of classic phenomenological analysis. It denotes the 
subjective quality of embodied experience and stands conceptually opposite to the body as physical thing (Ding) 
interacting with other objects. 
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In the case of acute anger, when and where is the vividness of one action-option 
(shouting, clenching one’s fists) and the obscurity of the other (lying down, closing one’s 
eyes) generated? In the motor programs themselves, or in some low level perception of these 
after they have already begun executing? Neither of these options seems quite right, because 
vividness and obscurity are phenomenal qualities known as such only in the process of 
experiencing, yet it is their particular effect that seems to usher us down one course of action 
rather than another. Leaving questions of causal priority aside for now, it is enough to grant 
the importance of the ‘should do’ in defining the ‘can do’ – phenomenologically speaking, it 
seems to found the feeling of immediate availability that comes along with the selection and 
selectivity of actions, especially in scenarios involving choice.  
 Two comments are in order concerning this last point. First of all, to those who might 
object to the priority I seem to be placing on the normative motivation of actions over the 
capacity to actually perform those actions, I should stress that I do not take the ‘I should’ to 
be independent of the ‘I can.’ Norms are shaped as much by capacities (i.e. the behavioral 
possibilities) as vice versa. For example, one’s concept of power and ability to deploy that 
power “arise on the ground of the body one is” (Sheets-Johnstone 1999, 156). A healthy child 
relative to a healthy adult can muster less physical strength, yet may be more nimble – the 
child’s sense of bodily capacity will hence be defined by his or her lived experiences of 
relative weakness and nimbleness, while the child’s sense of motor possibilities will be 
delimited by his or her sense of capacity. 
Secondly, to assuage doubts regarding the key role that normative constraint plays in 
the execution of actions, I ask you to imagine someone whose sensory-motor system is intact 
and who possesses an active sense of capacity, but who nonetheless lacks the sense of 
normative motivation which impels the performance of certain actions over others. The 
intuitive conclusion is that such a person would pass as being quite conscious, yet for all 
intents and purposes behave very much like the person in a persistent vegetative state. As a 
matter of fact, we needn’t rely on intuitions here – such a case has been documented by 
Antonio Damasio, and his diagnosis and observations are quite consistent with the intuitive 
assessment just offered. 
It is the very peculiar condition of suspended animation which brings our thought 
experiment to life. Damasio describes the case of a Mrs. T, who, for months after a stroke 
damaged the anterior cingulate cortex region of her brain, lies nearly motionless, blank-faced, 
and almost speechless in bed. She will occasionally pull her bed sheet up higher (assumed by 
Damasio to be a purely reflexive, autonomically-commanded action) or repeat her name, the 
names of loved ones or the name of her childhood town, but that is all. When she emerges 
from this mutism and akinesia a few months later, Mrs. T insists that she was indeed 
conscious, yet never felt herself to be imprisoned by her immobile and laconic state. As best 
she can report on the experience, she states that she simply felt no motivation to do anything 
other than she did: “I really had nothing to say” (Damasio 1996/2006, 73).  
Worth noting here is that suspended animation is a case distinct from indecision, 
where the motivation to decide and act remains intact – indeed the frustration of feeling torn 
between alternatives is an essential trait of the latter condition. Living in suspended animation 
seems akin to simply not caring to choose, feeling no reason to choose, and as a result, not 
executing sophisticated and self-directed acts. Without the felt normative constraining and 
weighting of our possibilities for action, the very motivation for performing any voluntary act 
seems to diminish or even disappear.
4
 
                                                            
4
 The anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) is generally recognized as key in generating the effort needed to carry out 
any motivated action, including pre-reflective actions such as emotion. Research shows that it is in the ACC that 
emotion, attention, and working memory interact “so intimately that they constitute the source for the energy of 
both external action (movement) and internal action (thought animation, reasoning)” (Damasio 1996/2006, 71). 
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If it is true that the motor-behavioral possibilities sensed while caught up in an 
emotion are arrayed in a preferential order, with some options feeling more vivid and viable, 
and others more obscure and unappealing, the question then becomes how these possibilities 
become harnessed to the attractive and aversive valences that are part and parcel of the 
experience of an acute emotion. Why are certain hedonic valences associated with certain 
emotions? To answer this it is inadequate to claim that emotional feelings parse out along a 
scale of pleasant, good feeling at one end and unpleasant, bad feeling at the other, and that 
these hedonic tones can be sourced back to the negative or positive meaning of the emotional 
target. This is the kind of view endorsed by Bennett Helm, for instance, when he states that 
“emotions are essentially feelings of things as good or bad in a certain way, and it is because 
these things feel good or bad to us that we can understand emotions to be pleasant or painful” 
(Helm 2009, 249). Jan Slaby (2008, 433) suggests this solution solves the “problem of 
emotionality from the outset.” Since pleasures and pains are consciously felt states with 
hedonic character, they could convey “a very direct sense of the fact that it is indeed the 
goodness or badness of something that is apprehended in emotional experiences.” 
This accounting for the link between emotional feeling and hedonic tone is 
fundamentally perceptualist in nature. The felt “apprehending” of something as good or bad 
is cast as the chief process and end of emotional experience. The flaw in this conception is 
that it leaves entirely unexplained the link between emotional feeling and more or less vivid 
or obscure motor possibilities. Put bluntly, it does not address the very meaning of the word 
emotion, which comes from the Latin ex (out) and movere (move); as early as the twelfth 
century, emouvoir was used in Old French to mean ‘to perturb’ or ‘agitate’ (OED 2012). In 
light of this explanatory omission, I submit that a productive theorizing of emotional feelings 
requires examining emotional feelings’ kinetic tone in relation to the corporeal circumstances 
at play in a given situation. It is relatively uncontroversial to state that emotions are first and 
foremost expressions of relational concerns that have to do with the agent’s well-being and 
well-faring in the world. As Nussbaum puts it, emotions concern “the salience for our well-
being of uncontrolled external objects” (2001, 1-2). Here I have in mind very basic 
existential-relational values such as threat, loss, gain, strengthening, weakening, community, 
autonomy, violation, vitality, viability, purposiveness, and efficacy.  
How do emotional feelings relate to the sensing of and responding to existential 
values on an animationist account? My proposal is that kinetic tone, a fundamental quality of 
animation, performs or enacts existential-relational meanings in emotional experience. Some 
illustrations are in order. Consider emotions as varied as animosity, jealousy, or frustration. 
These are typically felt through a kinetic tone of aggression, which preferences quick, 
explosive actions. One has the feeling of bursting into and even through barriers. Defensive 
emotions afford deflective actions, and carry the sense of shrinking away and avoiding 
impact. Feelings of repose invite slower, relaxed actions, as does timidity, though it carries an 
additional sense of caution and self-diminishment. Outgoingness, joviality, even Wanderlust 
play out into open, expansive, even self-transcending forward impulsion. Where aggressive 
emotions seem to carry a sense of breaking through barriers, these happy emotions come with 
a sense of opening out into the environment, as if coming to embrace it or be assorbed into it.  
                                                                                                                                                                                             
The dorsal side of the ACC is neuronally linked both to the prefrontal cortex (the center of executive 
functioning, such as planning and decision-making) and the parietal cortex (where the somatosensory center of 
the human cortex, the postcentral gyrus, is located). As a result, the ACC is a central go-between for both ‘top-
down’ and ‘bottom-up’ stimuli and controls. The ventral section of the ACC connects to the amygdala, the 
nucleus accumbens, the hypothalamus and the anterior insula, which constitute the much-studied processing 
centers for emotion and motivational information (cf. LeDoux 1998). As noted, research suggests the ACC is 
especially active when effort is required for action, including acts of learning and reasoning (cf. Allman et al 
2001). 
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Furthermore, which shades of emotion we assign to which kinetic tones or values 
need not be determined by whether one shade is always felt as unpleasant and another always 
as pleasant, because there just is no such invariant emotional tone; any shade of emotion can 
be felt as good or bad depending on the emotional target. Anger, for example, can feel 
liberating and self-enhancing when it is self-righteous, or discouraging and self-diminishing 
(or even self-destructive) when founded on recognized betrayal. The former case feels 
‘good,’ the latter not so, yet both can receive the label ‘anger.’ Both correlate to a certain 
sense of capacity and normative motivation: a sense that, in the first case, I can and am 
entitled to act out this anger, and in the second case, that I can’t undo or retaliate against the 
injury or insult already rendered. 
A puzzle emerges. If the proprioceptive feelings involved in emotional experience are 
built on an established repertoire of kinetic tones that express existential significance, one 
wonders how it is that proprioceptive feelings switch from relating exclusively to things 
happening in and to the body to relating to the agent’s better or worse faring in the world. To 
begin with, one might assume that all proprioceptive feelings are valenced a certain way from 
the start, i.e. that particular sensations are inherently assessed and felt as pleasant or painful. 
These pleasant and unpleasant sensations are then paired with anticipated events which are 
marked as good or bad, depending on past exposures. However, while it’s true that some 
bodily sensations feel good or bad in and of themselves (for example, a muscle cramp or 
overextending a joint is always painful), these sensations do not map well onto emotional 
feelings. A stomach cramp feels awful and can appear in emotions such as dread or grief. 
However, not every experience of dread or grief comes with uncomfortable visceral tightness. 
There are also many sensations that are neither painful nor pleasant on their own (e.g. the 
feeling of a quickening heartbeat), and will be felt as unpleasant or pleasant only upon 
contextualization. This first solution hence requires a strict association between 
proprioceptive sensation, hedonic tone and event which seems absent in concrete reality.  
An underexplored solution is to doubt that there is a switch at all: proprioceptive 
feelings are always already about the agent’s faring in the world. The often tacit assumption 
that bodily feelings must either be intra-corporeally directed, i.e. be about bodily states, or 
extra-corporeally directed, i.e. be about things outside the body, deserves serious re-
examination. Some scholars have indeed articulated an insight that calls this assumption into 
question: to focus attention on the agent or the world is to make a claim of emphasis, not one 
of difference. Matthew Ratcliffe (2008, 111), for example, writes that: 
 
I might well be aware of my tiredness, my sickness or my fatigue as states of 
myself, but I might equally be aware of them as states of the world. The 
unengaging, distant world can be what solicits sleep when one is very tired; 
thirst may be most conspicuous as the perceptual salience of a running stream; 
and various perturbations in the way the world appears might partly constitute 
the experience of illness.  
 
Further, as Max Scheler points out, “In the feeling of fatigue there is a warning that 
may be expressed in the language of common sense as ‘stop working’ or ‘go to sleep… The 
vertigo we experience when we stand before an abyss urges us to ‘step back’(1992, 82).” 
Ludwig Binswanger observes that, “When we are in a state of deeply felt hope or expectation 
and what we have hoped for proves illusory, then the world – in one stroke – becomes 
radically ‘different.’ We are completely uprooted, and we lose our footing in the world” 
(Binswanger 1968, 222).  
Emotional feelings, just like non-emotional feelings (whose existence this thesis in 
fact puts into question), cannot do without this unifying perspectivalism. Feelings are always 
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situated within the world as seen from the agent’s perspective and are significant only in 
virtue of that perspective. Our feelings come out of the submersion of the extra-corporeal in 
the sphere of the intra-corporeal; as Ratcliffe (2008, 1) puts it: “World-experience is not 
distinct from how one’s body feels; the two are utterly inextricable.” But the opposite seems 
to occur just as often, that is, a submersion of the intra-corporeal in the sphere of the extra-
corporeal. “The Nausea isn’t inside me,” Sartre puts it graphically, “I can feel it over there on 
the wall, on the braces, everywhere around me. It is one with the café, it is I who am inside 
it” (1963, 35).  
Ratcliffe, Scheler, Sartre and Binswanger are all expressing the same insight, it 
seems: feelings, and especially emotional feelings, bring to the fore the dynamic, fluctuating 
relationship between the agent’s exerted force on the world and the world’s exerted force on 
the agent. Binswanger considers more closely the example of disappointment, wherein, he 
urges, we lose our footing in a manner felt viscerally and not simply metaphorically:  
 
In such a moment our experience actually suffers, is torn from its position in 
the world and thrown upon its own resources. Until we can regain our 
equilibrium in the world, our whole existence moves within the meaning 
matrix of stumbling, sinking, and falling. If we call this general meaning 
matrix the ‘form,’ and the bitter disappointment the ‘content,’ we can see that 
in this case form and content are one. (ibid., 223) 
 
What more can be said of the ‘meaning matrices’ of emotional feeling? One way to 
flesh out this notion is by returning to the issue of intentionality within emotional experience. 
When we are emotionally engaged in the world, we feel pulled towards certain objects or 
features of objects and away from others – we are affectively propelled. Donn Welton’s 
analysis of affectivity within pre-reflective intentionality offers much to the account I am 
developing here. Rejecting the cognitivist idea that we are affectively drawn to objects 
because of a prior appraisal, Welton instead surmises that  
 
our previous ‘felt’ involvement with [objects] establishes kinetic values giving 
them the enticing powers they have. What Husserl calls ‘affective force’ is in 
play. ... The body is not secondary to the affect, added either to account for its 
cause or its effect. Rather, the tendency to move in one way and not another is 
inherent in the being of the affect. (Welton 2008, 19) 
 
Welton isolates three features which he posits as key in the organization of affective 
intentionality: (1) a feeling that, like Dewey’s “pervasive quality,” unifies the experience and 
gives it efficacy; (2) a motor tendency that lends the action animated by the feeling its 
direction; and (3) a valence to the object, its “soliciting feel.” These three together produce 
the telos of the emotion, Welton writes, “whose kinetic values reflexively draw the action as a 
whole” (ibid., 13). 
In the remainder of the essay, I will explore the idea that emotional feeling just is the 
transposition of the world’s existential impingement on or enhancement of the agent into a 
register of kinetic enactments. These kinetic enactments of relational concerns, I submit, are 
the basis of a robust phenomenological conception of animation. In one sense, to speak of a 
singular value is misleading; we are dealing with modes of value – the kinetic-somatic and 
the existential-relational. Yet, in another sense, we must speak of value in the singular, since 
emotional feeling collapses these two distinctive modes into one, what might be called the 
kineto-existential mode of valuing. 
Bottenberg 7 of 12 
Jan Slaby proposes (2008, 437) that emotional feelings are a “bodily sensitivity for 
what is significant in the world.” From its inception, the organism acts upon and is sensitive 
to the environment it is distinct from. It defines both itself and the world it takes in by 
boundaries imposed through experience; these boundaries are physical and chemical, somatic 
and social, and in sophisticated organisms also conceptual, metaphorical and 
(proto)linguistic. These boundaries are fluid and flexible, and thus require an intelligent 
sensitivity. Out of this intelligent sensitivity emerge the dynamics at play in emotional 
experience, what might be termed the dynamics of self-motivated somatic change, or self-
affectation. These dynamics somatically enact the fluctuating agent/world relationship, 
establishing Binswanger’s meaning matrices in that interaction.  
To say more precisely what this entails requires careful observation of the 
phenomenon of self-movement and the sensing of such movement. I wish to note three trail-
blazers in this venture. First, Maxine Sheets-Johnstone’s work has much to offer, even though 
she is dealing more broadly with, as she says, “thinking in movement,” and has almost 
nothing to say about emotional experience in particular. Sheets-Johnstone (1999, 56) begins 
her analysis by observing that “we perceive the qualia of our own movement; our bodily 
feelings of movement have a certain qualitative character.” We feel our movement as swift 
or slow, constricted or open, tense or loose, smooth or jerky, expansive or contractive, and so 
on. These qualia are not mental, but “the product of animation” (ibid., 57). Sheets-Johnstone 
distills four primary vectors from the many qualitative possibilities of self-sensed movement: 
tensional, linear, amplitudinal, and projectional (cf. also Sheets-Johnstone 1966). The 
tensional vector expresses the degree of effort felt in performing a movement, while the 
projectional vector captures how energy and force are released (hesitantly or ballistically, for 
example). The amplitudinal vector has to do with the felt expansive or contractive dimension 
of a movement, also in terms of the larger space occupied. Finally, the linear vector captures 
the contour and path described by a movement. While amplitudinal and linear qualitative 
vectors chiefly describe the spatial aspects of movement, tensional and projectional ones 
describe its temporal aspects.  
Sheets-Johnstone surmises that “complexity of affect may be tied to complexity of 
movement” (Sheets-Johnstone 1999, 84/fn 16), but unfortunately says nothing more on the 
matter. Nevertheless, it seems that her four primary qualities of movement map well onto the 
kinetic values of emotional animation.  
A second trail-blazer, Daniel Stern’s notion of vitality affects makes the connection 
between emotional, existential-relational and kinetic value explicit. Vitality affects, as Stern 
defines them, are “qualities [of experience] that do not fit into our existing lexicon or 
taxonomy of affects [but that] are better captured by dynamic, kinetic terms, such as 
‘surging,’ ‘fading away,’ ‘fleeting,’ ‘explosive,’ ‘crescendo,’ ‘decrescendo,’ ‘bursting,’ 
drawn out,’ and so on” (Stern 1985, 54). These qualities can be analyzed and classified using 
Sheets-Johnstone’s primary vectors. Here it is also worth recalling Binswanger’s comment on 
disappointment: he describes it as the sense of “our whole existence [moving] within the 
meaning matrix of stumbling, sinking, and falling” (Binswanger 1968, 223). It is instructive 
to consider all emotional feelings as built on the interplay of dynamic pulses.  
To apply the qualities of sensed self-movement to emotional dynamics and meaning, 
it is important to consider the range of action and behavior afforded by the diverse emotions. 
A trail-blazer in this regard is Slaby (2008, 439), who isolates three categories of action 
occurring within and through emotion. These are helpful in demonstrating the close bond 
between motor tendency, behavioral possibility and the kinetic values animated in emotion. 
First, what Slaby calls “full-blown action tendencies,” which urge the performance of a 
particular action (often an interaction), such as, for example, running from a bear or kissing 
someone. Second, there are “tendencies towards expressions of emotions,” i.e. actions which 
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express emotion, such as clapping one’s hands in delight, shouting in anger, or crying in 
sadness. Third, there are what Slaby calls “impossible movement impulses,” such as (to use 
his examples) “wanting to sink into the ground in shame; wanting to ‘explode’ in anger; 
wanting to ‘embrace the world’ in intensive joy or euphoria; wanting to literally ‘melt’ in 
affection.” 
Experiencing emotion as it unfolds is a matter not of sensing or perceiving, but of 
being animated to do something, even sometimes to do impossible things, like disappearing 
when we feel embarrassed. The urge to act out kinetic values is what unites these categories 
of emotion-driven action, or, more specifically, the emotion-driven response through action. 
And what is responded to in every instance are sensations, perceptions and images touching 
on how the agent is faring in the world, as construed from within his or her vantage point. 
These ideas all manifest themselves in Slaby’s rich description of fear and joy: 
 
In fear, for example, we feel as if pushed down by a threatening external force 
– a bodily tendency that is even more clearly perceivable in states of shock or 
sudden surprise. The bodily dynamics in these cases can be described as a kind 
of sudden narrowing; we feel as if the volume of our body is shrinking as 
effected by the working of an external force. An opposing tendency in the 
dynamics of intentional bodily feelings is a characteristic widening experience 
that we have in states of extreme joy, well-being or pride. A good example is 
the feeling of satisfaction after one’s work is done: Here, we might feel a kind 
of inner widening, an extension of our body volume, which is felt as 
something thoroughly positive and lets us feel quite “at home” in our current 
surroundings. In cases like this, it is our grasp of our current positive situation 
that consists in part in this widening of the felt body.  (Slaby 2008, 436) 
 
Slaby’s account calls for closer descriptive analysis. How does the experience of fear, 
for example, break down more precisely at the level of kineto-existential dynamics? An 
experience of fear begins with the interoceptively sensed narrowing of body volume, which 
comes in conjunction with the visualized (or otherwise externally sensed) object of threat. It 
is crucial to realize that both are needed to produce the current of kinetic energy that animates 
the agent toward particular behavioral possibilities. What determines how this engagement 
unfolds, though, is the interaction between the two modes of value at play in emotional 
experience, namely the kinetic and the existential-relational. In a typical case of fear, an 
object of threat is seen, but its impact is felt through the body volume shrinking. Put more 
strongly, the significance of the emotional object is fed into the first person body’s 
projections of possibilities for action. The essence of feeling threatened lies in it seeming as if 
the threatening object has already begun to assault the agent; the assault is imagined as 
occurring, its presence already sensed as a real pressure or force bearing down upon and 
shaking up the perimeter that separates agent from world. From the perspective of the agent, 
this constitutes a violation of her autonomy and her desire for self-preservation. Against the 
felt narrowing and contracting of the body a counter-force thus arises, one that re-affirms and 
shields the existential values currently violated. Stern’s choice of the term vitality to qualify 
affect dynamics is carefully chosen – fundamentally emotional experience arises in the face 
of challenges to (or enhancements of) the agent’s sense of his or her own vitality and 
viability. In our present example, we can assume the object continues to appear as 
threatening. The kinetic value animated in fear is not, as it would be in anger, one that affords 
lashing out at the object to force it to withdraw. Instead, the kinetic value animated in the 
experience of fear affords hiding or withdrawal strategies (actions which remove the agent 
from the incursion of the threat-object). In withdrawing, the agent’s sensed body volume 
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increases and the felt acuteness of her fear – in other terms, the kinetic energy grounding her 
fear – dissipates. 
 
 
3. Moving forward with kineto-existential phenomenology  
 
Animation is a term rich with meaning. The term connotes, on the one hand, a sense 
of inspiration and encouragement, of liveliness of manner, vivacity, and the process by which 
something becomes lively or enlivened, and, on the other hand, a sense relating to life and 
action per se: “The action or process of imparting life, vitality, or (as a sign of life) motion; 
quickening, vitalizing” (OED 2011, I.1-3 and II.4.a). These meanings are metaphysically 
neutral, that is, they need not be linked with a dualist or Judeo-Christian notion of animation 
as ‘ensoulment,’ the imparting of life to otherwise lifeless matter through the soul (anima).  
I have argued in this paper that the experience of emotion is made up of not only 
phenomenal and epistemological structures, but also performative ones, and that the 
transposition of existential value into the realm of the kinetic is at the heart of emotional 
agency and sense-making. It is for this reason that I call my approach animationist. In other 
words, animation, as I am using it, is meant to unite under one concept both the self-
movement and the self-motivation of living systems (the common Latin root is motus, lit. a 
motion). The ‘self’ involved in this may be quite primitive, something akin to the Gibsonian 
ecological self; the relevant distinction is between that which is animate and that which is 
inanimate. The inanimate is neither alive nor self-moving, and can be manipulated by 
external forces alone; it is determinate mechanism. 
It is worth noting that I am not the first to draw on the phenomenologically fertile 
concept of animation. As central as the sense of self-capacity (what Husserl in Ideas II and III 
and later Merleau-Ponty label the ‘I can’) is to phenomenological accounts of the 
foundational structures of somatic experience, its early theorizers recognized that this sense 
in turn is dependent on even more basic capacities: that of self-movement and the sensing of 
self-movement.
 
Husserl writes that “Animation designates the way in which mind acquires a 
locality in the spatial world, its spatialization, as it were, and together with its corporeal 
support, acquires reality” (Husserl 1977, 101). One is also reminded of Bergson’s élan vital 
(vital impulse) and Schopenhauer’s concept of the will-to-live. A number of recent theorists 
have recognized animation as necessary for knowledge. Sheets-Johnstone, for instance, 
following in the tradition of genetic phenomenology, calls somatic animation “the generative 
source of our primal sense of aliveness and of our primal capacity for sense-making” (1999, 
132). Enactivists and situated mind theorists such as Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, and 
Andy Clark, metabiologist Gerald Edelman and cyberneticist Humberto Maturana – among 
others – bind  together organism-level sense-making and movement by describing forms of 
organic self-organization. This is the notion of autopoiesis.  
It is my hope that the animationist approach I have begun to flesh out here can 
contribute to the investigation of what Sheets-Johnstone (1999, 142-143) calls the “cardinal 
structures of kinesthetic consciousness,” where kinesthetic consciousness is the pre-reflective 
awareness of an “unfolding kinetic dynamic.” This is a difficult project because it is a 
challenge to verbalize. As Sheets-Johnstone herself points out, “It is not only difficult to find 
adequate adjectives or nouns by which to describe the different qualities we experience in 
moving, but difficult to avoid unwanted associations along the way” (ibid., 148-9). How well 
do terms such as ‘force,’ ‘effort,’ and ‘energy’ capture dynamic tendencies, for example? The 
previous section’s descriptions of ‘the inside’ of emotional dynamics end by creating an 
impression of static content, or at best a call-and-response interaction between agent, object 
and world. However, there can be nothing static or unidirectional about the animation that is 
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at the heart of emotional experience; it is nothing else but the continuous generation of 
movement (im)pulses in the midst of ongoing adjustments between agent and world.  
No doubt many questions remain regarding the motivational awareness at play in 
emotional experience and the two modes of value which I have suggested are collapsed 
therein. Do the animative qualities of emotional experience follow or do they generate the 
meanings I have been calling existential? What is the relation of the performance of these 
qualities to rational knowing and thinking? These are the central questions most deserving of 
further attention. 
 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Achtenberg, D. (2002) Emotions as perceptions of value. In: Cognition of value in Aristotle’s  
ethics. Albany: SUNY Press, pp. 159-178. 
 
Allman, J. M., Hakeem, A., Erwin, J. M., Nimchinsky, E., Hof, P. (2001) The anterior 
cingulate cortex. The evolution of an interface between emotion and cognition. Annals of the 
New York Academy of Sciences 935 (1): 107–17. 
 
Binswanger, L. (1968) Being-in-the-world: Selected papers. New York: Harper & Row. 
 
Charland, L. C. (1997) Reconciling cognitive and perceptual theories of emotion: A 
representational proposal. Philosophy of Science 64: 555-579. 
 
Cole, J. (1995) Pride and a daily marathon. Cambridge, MA: MIT. 
 
Damasio, A. (1996) The somatic marker hypothesis and the possible functions of the 
prefrontal cortex. Philosophical Transactions: Biological Sciences 351 (1346):1413-1420. 
 
Damasio, A. (1996/2006) Descartes’ error: Emotion, reason and the human brain. London: 
Vintage. 
 
De Sousa, R. (1987) The rationality of emotion. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
 
Deonna, J. A. (2006) Emotion, perception, and perspective. dialectica 60: 29–46. 
 
Döring, S. (2007) Seeing what we do: Affective perception and rational motivation. 
dialectica 61: 363-394. 
 
Dunn, T. G., Gillig, S. E., Ponser, S. E., Weil, N. (1986) The learning process in biofeedback: 
Is it feedforward or feedback? Biofeedback & Self-Regulation 11(2): 143-55.  
 
Gallagher, S. (2006) How the Body Shapes the Mind. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Ghez, C. (2000) The control of movement. In: Principles of neural science. Kandel, E., 
Schwartz, J., Jessell, T. (eds). New York: McGraw-Hill. 
 
Goldie, P. (2004) Emotion, feeling, and knowledge of the world. In: Thinking about feeling, 
R. C. Solomon (ed). Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 91–106. 
Bottenberg 11 of 12 
 
Goldie, P. (2009) Getting feelings into emotional experience in the right way, Emotion 
Review 3: 232–239. 
 
Helm, B. W. (2009) Emotions as evaluative feelings. Emotion Review 1: 248-255. 
 
Husserl, E. (1977) Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological 
philosophy. Second book: Studies in the phenomenology of constitution (Ideas II). R. 
Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer (eds/trans). Dordrecht: Springer. 
 
LaCroix, J. M. (1981) The acquisition of autonomic control through biofeedback: The case 
against an afferent process and a two-process alternative. Psychophysiology 18: 573-87.  
 
LeDoux, J. E. (1998) The emotional brain: the mysterious underpinnings of emotional life. 
New York: Simon & Schuster. 
 
Lephart, S. M., Riemann, B. L, and Fu, F. H. (2000) Introduction to the sensorimotor system. 
In: Proprioception and neuromuscular control in joint stability. Windsor, Ontario: Human 
Kinetics, pp.  xvii-xxiv. 
 
Nussbaum, M. (2001) Upheavals of thought. The intelligence of emotions. Cambridge/New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
OED. animation. 2012. In oed.com (Oxford English Dictionary Online). 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/61249?rskey=vbmnZS&result=1&isAdvanced=false#eid 
(July 14, 2012).  
 
OED. emotion. 2012. In oed.com (Oxford English Dictionary Online). 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/61249?rskey=vbmnZS&result=1&isAdvanced=false#eid 
(December 15, 2011).  
 
 
Prinz, J. (2004) Gut reactions: A perceptual theory of emotion. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Prinz, J. (2007) Is emotion a form of perception? In: The modularity of emotion, L. Faucher 
and C. Tappolet (eds). Canadian Journal of Philosophy supplementary vol. 32, pp. 137–160. 
 
Ratcliffe, M. (2005) The feeling of being, Journal of Consciousness Studies 12: 43–60. 
 
Ratcliffe, M. (2008) Feelings of Being: Phenomenology, Psychiatry and the Sense of Reality. 
London/New York: Oxford University Press.  
 
Riemann, B. L., Lephart, S. M. (2002) The Sensorimotor System, Part I: The Physiologic 
Basis of Functional Joint Stability, Journal of Athletic Training 37 (1): 71–79. 
 
Roberts, R. C. (2003) Emotions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Rosenbaum, D. A., Vaughan, J., Jorgensen, M. J., Barns, H. J., and Stewart, E. (1993) Plans 
for object manipulation. In: Attention and Performance XIV: Synergies in Experimental 
Bottenberg 12 of 12 
Psychology, Artificial Intelligence, and Cognitive Neuroscience, D. E. Meyer and S. 
Kornblum (eds). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Sacks, O. (1985) The man who mistook his wife for a hat. London: Duck-worth. 
 
Salmela, M. (2011) Can emotion be modelled on perception? dialectica 65 (1): 1-29. 
 
Sartre, J. P. (1963) Nausea. R. Baldick (trans). London: Penguin. 
 
Scheler, M. (1992) On Feeling, Knowing and Valuing: Selected Papers. Chicago/London: 
Chicago University Press. 
 
Sheets-Johnstone, M. (1994) The roots of power: Animate form and gendered bodies. Peru, 
IL: Open Court. 
 
Sheets-Johnstone, M. (1999) The primacy of movement. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John 
Benjamins. 
 
Simoneau, M., Paillard, J., Bard, C., Teasdale, N., Martin, O., Fleury, M., Lamarre, Y. (1999) 
Role of the feedforward command and reafferent information in the coordination of a passing 
prehension task. Experimental Brain Research 128: 236–242. 
 
Slaby, J. (2008) Affective intentionality and the feeling body. Phenomenology and Cognitive 
Science 7: 429–444. 
 
Stern, D. (1985) Interpersonal world of the infant: A view from psychoanalysis and 
developmental psychology. New York: Basic Books. 
 
Stocker, M., and Hegeman, E. (1996) Valuing emotions. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Tappolet, C. (2000) Emotions et valeurs. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 
 
Welton, D. (2008, October) The emergence of affectivity and action. Presented at the Society 
for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy annual meeting, Pittsburgh, PA. 
